International Commercial Dispute Resolution by Smith, Steven et al.
International Commercial Dispute Resolution
STEVEN SMITH, BENJAMIN SMIETANA, GRANT GELBERG, IVANA CINGEL,
KEVIN RuBINo, SPENCER JONES, AND FREDERIC SOURGENS AND SEAN NEWELL*
I. Introduction
The first section of this survey looks at significant decisions in U.S. courts from 2007
that will be of interest to practitioners in the field of international commercial arbitration.
With some significant exceptions, federal courts continued to reinforce the strong policy
favoring enforcement of arbitration agreements and awards. Although refusing to compel
arbitration where it was clear that parties had not agreed to be bound by arbitration
clauses, the courts upheld the enforceability of arbitration agreements in the face of chal-
lenges based on the state-law defense of unconscionability, an allegedly defective arbitra-
tion clause, and domestic legislation that allegedly preempted the Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the "New York Convention").
In a major exception to the trend favoring enforcement of arbitration awards, however,
both the Second and Ninth Circuits produced potentially groundbreaking decisions up-
holding challenges to awards based on the arbitrators' failure to disclose potential conflicts
that arose during the course of arbitration. In addition, the D.C. Circuit refused to en-
force an award that had been set aside at the seat of arbitration, thus signaling the further
isolation of the Cbromalloy decision. This past year also produced significant decisions
supporting the use of courts in aid of arbitration. For example, the Second Circuit deliv-
ered two decisions upholding the use of foreign anti-suit injunctions to enjoin overseas
litigation of arbitrable claims. District court decisions also affirmed the availability of
state-law provisional remedies and a federal discovery statute in aid of international
arbitration.
The second section of this survey focuses on major developments from 2007 in the field
of investor-state arbitration. Significant jurisdictional awards concerned the determina-
tion of nationality under the ICSID Convention, the qualification of investments under
ICSID and specific investment treaties, investor compliance with local law, and timeliness
under relevant treaties. Procedural awards from 2007 show that parties continue to have
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little success in challenging arbitrators and only mixed success in seeking provisional mea-
sures, but that tribunals have continued to be receptive to participation by nonparties.
Numerous merits awards from 2007 contributed to the development of standards for as-
sessing fair and equitable treatment, indirect expropriation, and full protection and secur-
ity, while tribunals continue to disagree over the scope of so-called "umbrella clauses."
Significantly, 2007 saw three additional merits decisions and an annulment decision relat-
ing to disputes arising out of the Argentine financial crisis. The three merits awards all
rejected Argentina's necessity defense, while the annulment committee criticized without
overturning a tribunal's handling of that defense. These awards will be studied with great
interest as more disputes relating to the Argentine financial crisis come to decision. Also
of great interest was Bolivia's formal decision to withdraw from the ICSID Convention,
which may spark other disgruntled Latin American nations to follow suit.
II. Arbitration Developments in U.S. Courts
A. INTERPRETATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION CLAUSES
In notable decisions from 2007 concerning the enforcement of arbitration clauses, U.S.
courts consistently upheld the strong policy in favor of arbitration, rejecting efforts to
expand the grounds by which enforcement of an arbitration clause can be denied under
the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)' and the New York Convention. 2
1. Choice of Law Provisions and Arbitration Clauses
In Khan v. Parsons Global Services, the district court severely limited the applicability of
state law in governing the scope of international arbitrations in favor of the FAA. The
court specifically refused to apply California's arbitration law to a dispute concerning the
enforceability of an arbitration clause in an employment agreement-despite the con-
tract's express reference to California law in the choice-of-law provision of the arbitration
clause.3
The defendant employee in Khan, a British citizen, opposed the plaintiff U.S. em-
ployer's motion to compel arbitration under the employment contract's arbitration clause
by invoking California's unconscionability defense.4 The plaintiff employer countered
that, because the defendant employee was not a U.S. citizen, the FAA applied by default
and that pursuant to the FAA only the New York Convention's defenses to enforcement
were applicable. 5 Because the defense of unconscionability is not recognized under Article
11(3) of the New York Convention, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant could not resist
arbitration on such grounds.6
1. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2002).
2. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958,21 U.S.T.
2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (implemented into U.S. law at 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208) [hereinafter New York
Convention].
3. Khan v. Parsons Global Servs., 480 F. Supp. 2d 327 (D.D.C. 2007).
4. Id at 335-36.
5. Id. at 336; Federal Arbitration Act §§ 201-202.
6. Kkan, 480 F. Supp. 2d, at 336.
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The Khan court determined that arbitration agreements meeting the requirements of
the FAA or the New York Convention must, by default, be governed by federal law.7 In
reaching its decision, the court referenced the Supreme Court's decision in Mastrobuono v.
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., which stated that a choice-of-law clause invoking state law
does not automatically indicate that the parties intended to opt out of federal default
rules.8 In Mastrobuono, the Supreme Court determined that, in order to opt-out of federal
default rules, the parties must clearly evidence such intent.9 The Khan court relied on this
precedent in determining that a generic choice-of-law clause, by itself, is insufficient to
provide clear evidence that the parties intended to opt out of the default federal stan-
dards.' 0 It is notable that the Khan court reached this conclusion despite noting that the
California choice-of-law clause was contained withing the employment agreement's arbi-
tration clause.
The Khan decision contrasts with the decision in Felman Production, Inc. v. Bannai. In
the Bannai case, the district court held that the enforceability of an arbitration clause
against a non-signatory would be governed by English law, rather than the FAA, pursuant
to the English choice-of-law provision contained in the arbitration clause. 11 Relying on
the Supreme Court's decision in Volt Information Sciences v. Board of Trustees,12 the court
concluded that the parties had chosen English law to govern the arbitration and that the
FAA could not override the parties' choice. Determining that English law did not permit
an arbitration clause to be enforced against a non-signatory under the circumstances, the
court refused to compel arbitration.
2. Potentially Defective Arbitration Clauses
In Apple & Eve, LLC v. Yantai North Andre Juice Co., the district court compelled arbitra-
tion in China despite the arbitration clause's vague reference to arbitration "in the country
of defendant in accordance with the arbitration organization of the defendant country."'13
The court agreed that the inclusion of a non-existent forum is properly classified as a
mistake and is therefore grounds for an exception to enforcement under Article 11(3) of
the New York Convention.' 4 The court stated that the arbitration clause did not refer-
ence a non-existent forum because once the facts of the dispute were applied, the clause
clearly identified China as the situs of the arbitration.' 5
The court also rejected the alternative argument that an arbitration agreement that fails
to designate an arbitration commission is null and void and incapable of being performed
under Chinese law.16 The court noted, however, that Chinese law also allows the parties
7. Id. at 338.
8. Id. at 337 (citing Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 60 (1995)).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 338.
11. Felman Prod., Inc. v. Bannai, 476 F. Supp. 2d 585 (S.D. W.Va. 2007).
12. Volt Info. Scis. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
13. Apple & Eve, LLC v. antai N. Andre Jouice Co., 499 F. Supp. 2d 245, 246 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
14. Id. at 249 (citing Rosgoscirc v. Circus Show Corp., 1993 WL 277333, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), which de-
clared an arbitration clause null and void as a mistake where it referred to arbitration before a non-existent
entity-"the International Arbitration in the Hague (the Netherlands)").
15. Id. at 248-49. The respondent in the arbitration was a citizen of China.
16. Id. at 250 (citing Article 16 of the Peoples Republic of China's Arbitration Law, which requires an
arbitration agreement to include: "(1) an expression of intention to apply for arbitration; (2) matters for
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to correct such a defect through a supplementary agreement, and only if such efforts fail is
the agreement invalid. 17 The court ruled that because the alleged defect in the arbitration
clause was curable under Chinese law, it was not incapable of being performed.' 8
3. Ability to Compel Arbitration Against Successor
In Republic of Ecuador v. ChevronTexaco Corp., the district court addressed whether an
arbitration agreement could be enforced against a successor that had never formally
adopted its predecessor's obligations under the agreement.19 The dispute at issue in-
volved allocation of responsibility for environmental liabilities arising from the joint oper-
ation of an Ecuadorian oil field by a state-owned oil and gas company, CEPE, and
Chevron. In addressing whether CEPE should be estopped from denying that it was
bound by the arbitration agreement, the court sought to determine whether Chevron rea-
sonably relied on the laws of Ecuador in its belief that CEPE was bound as a successor to
the agreement. 20 Thus, CEPE's ability as a government entity to succeed to the joint
operating agreement under Ecuador's Constitution and other relevant domestic law be-
came central to the court's determination. 21
Examining Ecuadorian law at the time CEPE took over joint operation of the oil fields,
the court found that an Ecuadorian court would not have enforced the arbitration agree-
ment because: 1) there were uncertainties under Ecuador's Constitution as to whether
CEPE could even assume its predecessor's obligations under the arbitration agreement;22
and 2) even if it could, there were further uncertainties under Ecuador's domestic law as to
whether the proper contracting procedures were followed to bind CEPE, as a government
entity, to the joint operating agreement's arbitration clause. 23 The court also noted that
Chevron had never expressed a belief that the joint operating agreement was still in effect
at the time of the dispute.24 Based upon the uncertainties under Ecuador's law at the time
CEPE began jointly operating the oilfields and the conduct by Chevron evidencing that it
did not believe the former operating agreement was still in effect, the court determined
that Chevron could not prove it reasonably relied on an understanding that the arbitration
agreement bound CEPE. The court therefore rejected Chevron's estoppel argument and
refused to compel arbitration.25
arbitration, and (3) a designated arbitration commission."). The party opposing the arbitration noted that, at
that time, there were 186 arbitration commissions located in China. Id.
17. Id. (citing Article 18 of the Peoples Republic of China's Arbitration Law).
18. Id. at 251-52.
19. Republic of Ecuador v. Chevron Texaco Corp., 499 F. Supp. 2d 452 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). The decision resulted
from a foreign law hearing under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1.
20. Id. at 459-60 (citing Frederick v. Comm'r, 126 F.3d 433, 448-49 (3d Cir. 1997) and Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts § 90 (1981)).
21. Id. at 459-460.
22. Id. at 463-465. The court determined that the state of Ecuador's arbitration law at the time CEPE
succeeded its U.S. predecessor was "too unsettled" because there were uncertainties as to whether Ecuador's
Constitution at that time would have precluded arbitration in Ecuador. Id. at 465.
23. Id. at 461-63.
24. Id. at 467-68.
25. Id. The court determined that an Ecuadorian court would find no reasonable expectation on the U.S.
company's part that the joint operation agreement would bind CEPE to arbitration sought for the first time
thirty years after CEPE joined in the operation of the oil fields. Id. at 468.
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4. Preemption of Domestic Law Limiting the Enforcement of Arbitration Clauses
Several decisions in 2007 reaffirmed the principle that the New York Convention
preempts domestic law that would otherwise limit the enforceability of arbitration clauses.
Three federal district court decisions from 2007 and one from late 2006 considered
whether the New York Convention supersedes the McCarran-Ferguson Act, under which
state law regulating the business of insurance takes precedence over federal laws that do
not specifically relate to insurance. All four cases held that the New York Convention
supersedes the McCarran-Ferguson Act and that arbitration clauses falling under the
Convention were enforceable despite state law that would otherwise render them unen-
forceable.26 These decisions declined to follow the Second Circuit's decision in Stepbens
v. American International Insurance Co., which had held to the contrary.2 7 The district
courts relied on principles of international comity as well as the strong federal policy in
favor of arbitration. 28 Some of the courts also noted that the New York Convention was
implemented in the United States after passage of the McCarran-Ferguson Act and that
the legislative history of the McCarran-Ferguson Act indicated that it was limited to do-
mestic interstate commerce and was not intended to reach foreign commerce.29
Two cases also held that the New York Convention supersedes the Seaman's Wage Act,
which gives seamen the right to access federal courts to resolve wage disputes. The Elev-
enth Circuit held in Lobo v. Celebrity Cruises that the New York Convention controls and
that any arbitration clause falling under the Convention was enforceable despite the terms
of the Act.30 This decision was followed by the district court in Balen v. Holland America
Line.31
B. ENFORCEMENT OF AWARDS
Decisions from 2007 illustrated that U.S. courts are generally willing to respect the
decisions of foreign courts regarding the enforceability of arbitration awards and, when
the circumstances warrant, to take steps to protect their own determinations regarding
enforceability from being vitiated in foreign jurisdictions. Two appellate court decisions,
however, show that U.S. courts are willing to vacate awards where arbitrators demonstrate
evident partiality.
1. Arbitrator Challenges-Evident Partiality
Two significant decisions in 2007 considering arbitrator challenges both found that ar-
bitrators had exhibited "evident partiality" in failing to disclose potential conflicts. In New
26. See Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London v. Sinon, 2007 WL 3047128 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 18, 2007);
Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. SR Int'l Bus. Ins. Co., 2007 WL 2752366 (W.D. Ark. Sept. 20, 2007); Clow v. Ins. Corp.
of British Columbia, 2007 WL 2292689 (D. Or. Aug. 6, 2007); Goshawk Dedicated Ltd. v. Portsmouth Settlement
Co., 466 F. Supp. 2d 1293 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
27. Stephens v. Am. Int'l Ins. Co., 66 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1995).
28. See Simon, 2007 WL 3047128, at *6-7; Murphy Oil, 2007 VvL 2752366, at *3-4; Clow, 2007 WL
2292689, at *4 n.6; Goshawk, 446 F. Supp. 2d at 1304-06.
29. See Murphy Oil, 2007 WL 2752366, at *3; Clow, 2007 WL 2292689, at *4 n.5; Goshawk, 446 F. Supp.
2d, at 1305 n.9.
30. Lobo v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 488 F.3d 891 (11th Cir. 2007).
31. Balen v. Holland America Line, Inc., 2007 WL 4190407 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 20, 2007).
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Regency Productions, Inc. v. Nippon Herald Films, Inc., the Ninth Circuit affirmed that an
award was properly vacated on grounds of evident partiality where an arbitrator had failed
to disclose a possible conflict that had arisen when the arbitrator changed employers dur-
ing the arbitration proceedings. 3 2 The motion to vacate centered upon the arbitrator's
failure to disclose that his new employer was in negotiations to finance and co-produce a
significant motion picture with a production executive of one of the parties to the arbitra-
tion-even though there was no evidence that the arbitrator was aware of these
negotiations.33
The Ninth Circuit determined that an arbitrator has a duty to affirmatively investigate
possible conflicts resulting from a change in his employment circumstances and to disclose
the change in circumstances to the parties, especially where the new employment is in the
same industry as that of the parties.34 Based upon this duty, the court relied on its previ-
ous decision in Schmitz v. Zilveti to hold that knowledge of the potential conflict is irrele-
vant.3 5 The Ninth Circuit was also influenced by the fact that the arbitrator had disclosed
potential conflicts at the beginning of the arbitration that were similar to the potential
conflict at issue but had failed to continue this pattern of disclosure throughout the arbi-
tration. 36 In reaching its decision, the Ninth Circuit cited to decisions by the Second,
Fourth, and Eighth Circuits for support and noted that the Eleventh Circuit is the only
federal court of appeal to hold that a lack of actual knowledge of the potential conflict
precluded the finding of evident partiality. 37
The Second Circuit decision cited by the Ninth Circuit in New Regency was also decided
in 2007. In Applied Industrial Materials Corp. v. Ovalar Makine Ticaret Ve Sanayi, A.S., the
Second Circuit affirmed that an award was properly vacated on grounds of evident partial-
ity where the arbitrator failed either: 1) to investigate what he knew to be a potential
business relationship between his corporation and one of the parties or 2) to inform the
parties that he had created a "Chinese wall" to prevent himself from learning more.38 The
Second Circuit determined that, while not having a "free-standing duty to investigate," an
arbitrator who has reason to believe in the existence of a nontrivial conflict of interest
must either investigate the circumstances or disclose an intention not to investigate.39
The court believed that otherwise the parties would be misled into believing that no non-
trivial conflict exists.40
The Second Circuit's refusal to impose a free-standing duty to investigate seems at odds
with the Ninth Circuit's decision in New Regency, which found an affirmative duty to in-
vestigate when a change in circumstances could potentially create conflicts. Like the
32. New Regency Prods., Inc. v. Nippon Herald Films, Inc., 501 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2007).
33. Id. at 1110-11. The court noted that the high-profile nature of the film that was the subject of the
negotiations meant that the possible partiality was not trivial. Id. at 1111.
34. Id. at 1109-10.
35. Id. at 1106, 1108-09 (citing Scbmitz v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 1994)).
36. Id. at 1110.
37. Id. at 1108-09 (citing Applied Indus. Materials Corp. v. Ovalar Makine Ticaret Ve Sanayi, A.S., 492 F.3d
132 (2d Cir. 2007); ANR Coal Co. v. Cogentrix of Nort Carolina, Inc., 173 F.3d 493 (4th Cir. 1999); Olson v.
Merrill Lynch, Inc., 51 F.3d 157 (8th Cir. 1995); Gianelli Money Purchase Plan & Trust v. ADM Investor Servs.,
Inc., 146 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 1998)).
38. Applied Indus. Materials Corp., 492 F.3d at 138.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 138-39.
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Ninth Circuit, however, the Second Circuit noted that the arbitrator's initial disclosure
statements created a reasonable expectation among the parties that they would be notified
of any future developments. The court determined that the failure to make a later disclo-
sure, when viewed in light of the initial disclosures, created the appearance of partiality.41
In a footnote regarding the potential use of a "Chinese wall," the Second Circuit de-
clined to hold that such a protective measure is an adequate substitute for investigation.
Rather, the court determined that the arbitrator should have consulted with the parties
before putting the wall into place, instead of merely informing them after unilaterally
choosing to take such an action. 42
2. Enforcement of Awards Set Aside by Courts at the Seat of Arbitration
In Termorio S.A. E.S.P. v. Electranta S.P., the D.C. Circuit refused to enforce an arbitral
award that had been set aside by a Columbian court as contrary to Columbian law.43 The
Termorio court based its determination on Article V(1)(e) of the New York Convention,
which allows the courts of a contracting state to refuse to enforce an arbitral award upon
proof that the award "has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the
country in which, or under the law of which, that award was made." 44 The D.C. Circuit
noted that to hold otherwise through application of the FAA would undermine the finality
of international arbitration awards and lead to conflicting judgments. 45
Noting the apparent discretionary nature of Article V(1),46 the Termorio court recog-
nized that there is an implicit "public policy gloss" on Article V(1)(e) that could poten-
tially allow enforcement despite the award being set aside in a domestic court in the
jurisdiction where the arbitration occurred. 47 The court determined, however, that
"[w]hen a competent foreign court has nullified a foreign arbitration award, United States
courts should not go behind that decision absent extraordinary circumstances .... "48
Because the appellant did not provide any evidence indicating that the proceedings before
the Columbian court violated basic notions of justice, the court determined that no such
"extraordinary circumstances" existed and denied the appeal.49
The Termorio decision casts further doubt on the continuing viability of the Chromalloy
decision, which is the only U.S. case confirming an arbitral award set aside in the country
41. Id. at 136, 139.
42. Id. at 138 n.1.
43. Termorio SA. E.S.P. v. Electranta S.P., 487 F.3d 928 (D.C. Cir. 2007). The arbitration clause at issue
required arbitration under the ICC Rules. The Columbian Council of State overturned the arbitral tribunal's
award because Columbian law as of the date of the arbitration agreement did not expressly permit use of the
ICC Rules in arbitration. Id. at 931.
44. Id, at 934 (as implemented by the Federal Arbitration Act, supra note 1, § 207).
45. Id. at 936 (citing Baker Marine (Nig.) Ltd. v. Cbevron (Nig.) Ltd., 191 F.3d 194 (2d Cir. 1999)).
46. Id. (noting that the language of Article V(1) states that "[rlecognition and enforcement may be refused"
and quoting Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 931 (D.C. Cir. 1984), which
stated that "a state is not required to give effect to foreign judicial proceedings grounded on policies which do
violence to its own fundamental interests").
47. Id. at 937 (citing Baker Marine, 191 F.3d, at 197 n.3).
48. Id. at 938 (quoting Appellees' Br. at 12)
49. Id. at 939.
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where the award was made.50 In contrast, European courts have appeared more willing in
such circumstances to allow enforcement of the award under domestic arbitration law. 51
3. Anti-Suit Injunctions in Aid of Enforcement
In Karaha Bodas Co., L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara,
the Second Circuit clarified that the proper test to apply in determining whether to issue
an anti-suit injunction in aid of enforcement of an international arbitral award is the
"China Trade Test," as set forth in China Trade & Development Corp. v. M. V. Choong Yong.52
In Karaha Bodas, the prevailing party in a Swiss arbitration had the award confirmed in the
United States and sought enforcement of the resulting judgment in the Southern District
of New York.53 In the meantime, the losing party filed an action in the Cayman Islands
seeking damages against the prevailing party for, among other losses, the amount of the
arbitral award.54 The prevailing party then sought an anti-suit injunction in the Southern
District of New York to prevent the Cayman Islands action.55
The district court, in examining the Second Circuit's China Trade decision, noted that
China Trade involved an anti-suit injunction prohibiting a foreign defendant from pursu-
ing a parallel proceeding in a foreign forum while a proceeding was pending in the South-
ern District of New York. The district court determined that a "more lenient standard"
for anti-suit injunctions applied after the domestic judgment had already been rendered. 56
The Second Circuit determined that the district court erred in making this distinction and
held that the China Trade Test was the proper test in all instances of anti-suit injunctions
aimed at foreign proceedings.57 The Second Circuit nevertheless determined that, despite
applying the wrong legal standard, the district court reached the proper result and af-
firmed the decision. It noted that federal courts should not attempt to protect a party
seeking enforcement of an award under the New York Convention from all legal hardships
associated with foreign litigation over an award. 58 Nevertheless, federal courts do have
inherent power to protect their own judgments from being vitiated by vexatious litigation
in other jurisdictions. 59 Because the losing party was attempting to re-litigate issues in the
50. In re Chromalloy Aero Services, 939 F. Supp. 907 (D.D.C. 1996).
51. See, e.g., Steven L. Smith, Enforcement of International Arbitration Awards Under the New York Convention,
in Rhoades, et al., Practitioner's Handbook on International Arbitration and Mediation (2d ed. 2007) at § 8.05[8].
52. Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 500 F.3d 111, 112 (2d Cir.
2007) (citing China Trade & Dev. Corp. v. MV. Choong Yong, 837 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1987)). The China Trade
Test allows an anti-suit injunction against foreign litigation "only if two threshold requirements are met: (A)
the parties are the same in both matters, and (B) resolution of the case before the enjoining court is disposi-
tive of the action to be enjoined." Id. at 119. Once these two threshold issues are satisfied, the court must
also consider whether the parallel litigation would: "(1) frustrate a policy in the enjoining forum; (2) be
vexatious; (3) threaten the issuing court's in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction; (4) prejudice other equitable
considerations; or (5) result in delay, inconvenience, expense, inconsistency, or a race to judgment." Id.
53. Karaha Bodas, 500 F.3d, at 114, 116.
54. Id. at 117.
55. Id. at 117-18.
56. Id. at 119.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 123.
59. Id. at 124.
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Cayman Islands that had already been decided in the U.S. courts, the issuance of an anti-
suit injunction under the China Trade Test served such ends. 60
Karaha Bodas was one of two Second Circuit decisions in 2007 to consider use of a
foreign anti-suit injunction in aid of arbitration. Earlier, the same court upheld an anti-
suit injunction in Ibeto Petrochemical Industries, Inc. v. MIT Beffen, barring parties to an
ongoing London arbitration from pursuing litigation of the same matter in Nigeria. 61
The court also applied the China Trade Test to find that an anti-suit injunction was war-
ranted. The court also noted, however, that in light of concerns for international comity,
such injunctions should be used sparingly. The court accordingly ordered that the injunc-
tion be modified so that it applied only to the parties before the court and lasted only until
the conclusion of the arbitration.
On a related note, two decisions in 2007 also confirmed international arbitral awards
that included anti-suit injunctions as part of their remedies. In Rintin Corp. v. Domar, Ltd.,
the Eleventh Circuit upheld an award that ordered one of the parties to terminate foreign
lawsuits it had initiated against affiliates of other parties to the arbitration.62 The court
held that because this remedy did not exceed the scope of the dispute before the arbitral
tribunal, it was within the tribunal's jurisdiction. Likewise, the district court in Telenor
Mobile Communications AS v. Storm L.L.C. confirmed an arbitral award that enjoined one
of the parties from pursuing litigation in Ukraine.63 The court held that the tribunal had
broad discretion to determine appropriate remedies for the dispute before it and had acted
within its powers. These two decisions suggest that parties to international arbitrations
may look to arbitral tribunals, in addition to the courts, for anti-suit injunctions to aid in
the resolution of litigation related to the parties' arbitration.
C. AVAILABILITY OF COURT-ORDERED PROVISIONAL REMEDIES AND DISCOVERY
1. Provisional Remedies
Faced with the question of whether federal courts have authority to grant injunctions
and other provisional remedies in the context of pending international arbitrations, the
Second Circuit courts continue to stand apart from other circuits by providing for such
authority. In Bahrain Telecommunications Co. v. DiscoveryTel, Inc., the district court for the
District of Connecticut denied a motion to dismiss an application under Connecticut law
for a pendente lite order, concluding that the New York Convention did not deprive the
court of jurisdiction to issue such orders. 64 After the parties had commenced arbitration
in the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA), the petitioner sought an order
from the district court to discover, attach, and garnish assets of the respondents sufficient
to secure the petitioner's damages claim. The respondents moved to dismiss the motion
on the ground that the district court lacked jurisdiction to do so while the arbitration was
pending. 65
60. Id. at 121-22, 124.
61. Ibeto Petrochemical Indus. v. MIT Beffen, 475 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2007).
62. Rintin Corp. v. Domar, Ltd., 476 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2007).
63. Telenor Mobile Commc'nsAS v. Storm LLC, 524 F.Supp. 2d 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
64. Bahrain Telcomms. Co. v. DiscoveryTel, Inc., 476 F. Supp. 2d 176 (D. Conn. 2007) (referring to Conn.
Gen. Stat. § 52-422 (2007)).
65. Id. at 178-79.
SUMMER 2008
372 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
Differentiating Second Circuit precedent from that of the Third and Ninth Circuits,
the district court determined that nothing in the FAA or the New York Convention de-
prives federal courts of jurisdiction to grant injunctions and provisional remedies in the
context of pending arbitrations.66 The district court then ruled that the Connecticut's
adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration au-
thorized the court to grant pendent lite relief in connection with international arbitra-
tions.67 The district court further noted that the ability of the arbitral tribunal to grant
pendente lite relief, as authorized by the LCIA Rules, does not act to deprive the federal
courts of this power. 68 The court also rejected the respondent's suggestion that Second
Circuit precedent applied only to injunctive relief and not to prejudgment remedies.69
2. Discovery in Aid of Arbitration Under 28 U.S.C. § 1782
A U.S. federal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1782, authorizes district courts to compel persons
located in their district to provide testimony or produce documents "for use in a proceed-
ing in a foreign or international tribunal."70 Two circuit court decisions have previously
held that the phrase "foreign or international tribunal" does not include a foreign arbitral
tribunal. 71 These decisions were cast into doubt, however, by the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., in which the Court stated in dicta that
the term "tribunal" as used in Section 1782 "includes investigating magistrates, adminis-
trative and arbitral tribunals, and quasi-judicial agencies, as well as conventional ...
courts."
7 2
In the wake of the Intel decision, two district court decisions have held that parties may
use Section 1782 to seek evidence in aid of a foreign arbitration. In In re Roz Trading, Ltd.,
decided in late 2006, the court, expressly relied on Intel to hold that an Austrian arbitral
tribunal was a foreign tribunal within the meaning of Section 1782 and ordered the pro-
duction of documents pursuant to the statute. 73 This decision was followed by In re Oxus
Gold PLC, where the court held that it had authority under Section 1782 to order third-
party discovery in connection with a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) arbitration between
a U.K. company and a state-owned Kyrgyz company.74 The court did not rely on Intel
but instead based its holding on the fact that the arbitration was conducted pursuant to a
66. Id. at 180 (relying on Am. Express Fin. Advisors, Inc. v. Thorley, 147 F.3d 229, 231 (2d Cir. 1998) and
rejecting both Simula, Inc. v. Autoliv, Inc., 175 F.3d 716 (9th Cir. 1999) and McCreary Tire & Rubber Co. v.
CEAT, 501 F.2d 1032 (3d Cir. 1974)).
67. Babrain Telecomms., 476 F. Supp. 2d, at 184 (citing Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 50a-139). The court noted that
the most recent report of the UNCITRAL Working Group on Arbitration confirms that the provisional
remedy section was not intended to be limited to arbitrations pending within the forum state. Id. (citing U.N.
Comm. on Int'l Trade Law, Working Group II (Arbitration), Settlement of Commercial Disputes: Interim Measures of
Protection, at 7-8, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.141 (Dec. 5, 2005)).
68. Id. at 180, 182 (noting that the court was also significantly persuaded by the fact that the Article 25.3 of
the LCIA Rules expressly allowed the parties to seek provisional remedies outside of the tribunal in "excep-
tional cases").
69. Id. at 181, 182.
70. 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (1996).
71. See Nat'l Broad. Co.v. Bear Stearns & Co., 165 F.3d 184 (2d Cir. 1999); Republic of Kazakbstan v.
Biedermann Int'l, 168 F.3d 880 (5th Cir. 1999).
72. Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 258 (2004).
73. In re Roz Trading, Ltd., 469 F. Supp. 2d 1221 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
74. In re Oxus Gold PLC, 2007 WL 1037387 (D.NJ. 2007).
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BIT agreement between two governments. According to the court, this framework meant
that the arbitral panel was a foreign tribunal for purposes of Section 1782.
m. Investor-State Disputes
A. JURISDICTION AND ADMISSIBILITY
1. Investor Standing-Defining Nationality
Investment treaty arbitration has been described as "arbitration without privity" be-
cause dispute settlement procedures in investment treaties permit an investor to bring
claims against a state without the parties' prior agreement to arbitrate. 75 The desirability
of a neutral forum for settling investment disputes has inevitably led to legal wrangling
over who may invoke the benefits of the ICSID Convention or a BIT. Thus, whether a
claimant qualifies as an investor under the relevant treaty is a critical threshold issue.
The protections of the ICSID Convention and BITs extend only to investors of another
contracting state, where diversity of nationality is required between the investor and the
state involved in the dispute. The decision in Siag & Veccbi v. Egypt addressed whether
investors who were Egyptian citizens before becoming citizens of another state had, as a
result, lost their Egyptian nationality for purposes of the ICSID Convention.7 6 The IC-
SID Convention imposes both positive and negative nationality requirements. 77 The
principal question in Siag concerned whether the claimants met the negative nationality
requirement. "That is, were the Claimants, at the relevant times under Article 2 5, nation-
als of the Host State, Egypt, and so barred from bringing their claim before ICSID under
the ICSID Convention?"7 8 The tribunal, relying on Soufraki v. United Arab Emirates79
and Egyptian law, held that official documents, such as a passport, provided only prima
facie evidence of nationality8 0 and did not relieve the tribunal of its duty under interna-
tional law to interpret Egyptian law in order to determine the claimants' nationality.
81
The tribunal concluded that the claimants were no longer Egyptian nationals under Egyp-
tian law and therefore had jurisdiction over the dispute. Citing Champion Trading Co. v.
Egypt,82 the tribunal stated that evidence of the investor's substantial connections to Egypt
75. Jan Paulsson, Arbitration Without Privity, 10 ICSID REv. 32, 232-257 (1995).
76. Siag & Veccbi v. Egypt, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/15 (May 28, 2007) [hereinaf-
ter Siag].
77. The positive nationality requirement is governed by the first part of Article 25(2)(a) of the Convention
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of other States (ICSID). It requires
that the claimant have the nationality of a contracting state of the ICSID Convention on the date the parties
gave their arbitration consent and on the date the dispute was registered. The negative nationality require-
ment is governed by the second part of Article 25(2)(a). It requires that the claimant not also have the
nationality of the respondent contracting state on those dates.
78. Slag, supra note 76, 142.
79. Sonfraki v. United Arab Emirates, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/7 fJuly 7, 2004) [hereinafter
Soufrakl.
80. Id. IT 150-53.
81. Id. 1 153.
82. Champion Trading Co. v. Egypt, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/9 (Oct. 21, 2003).
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was irrelevant because "the regime established under Article 25 of the ICSID [Conven-
tion] does not leave room for a test of dominant or effective nationality."8 3
Professor Francisco Orrego Vicufia filed a partial dissenting opinion. The dissent advo-
cated the application of an effective nationality test,84 noting that "[t]he investor was
Egyptian at the time the investment was made, benefited from Egyptian legislation grant-
ing exclusive rights to Egyptian citizens and was at all times considered to be Egyptian,
not just by the Egyptian Government but this was also his own understanding and that of
his family."85 "The principle of effectiveness," the dissent argued, prevented the more
convenient nationality (for the investor) to "prevail over the real and effective
nationality."8 6
2. Defining Investment
The definition of investment is at heart of many challenges in treaty arbitration pro-
ceedings. These challenges emanate from two sources: the applicable investment treaty
and the ICSID Convention itself. In 2007, both grounds for challenging the existence of
an investment were argued and both succeeded, but not without controversy.
a. Qualifying Investments Under the ICSID Convention
The ICSID Convention does not define what constitutes an investment but instead
leaves this definition to the specific instruments of state consent to arbitration.8 7 Conse-
quently, states have experienced more success arguing that a particular foreign economic
contribution is not an investment under a BIT than by arguing that it fails under the
Convention. For example, in Saipem v. Bangladesh88 the tribunal applied the four-part test
developed in Salini v. Morocco89 to determine whether the claimant had made an invest-
ment under the ICSID Convention, looking at the following factors: 1) the contribution
of monetary or other value to the host state, 2) duration, 3) risk, and 4) a contribution to
the development of the host state. 90 The tribunal noted that the need for a contribution
to the development of the host state "is sometimes put in doubt."91 In finding jurisdic-
tion, the tribunal rejected Bangladesh's arguments that the project did not qualify as an
investment under the ICSID Convention based on its duration and the local origin of the
underlying funds.92 Saipem is in accord with the decision in Siag, which also declined to
83. Siag, supra note 76, 198.
84. Id. 1 62-63.
85. Id. 63.
86. Id. 68. The dissent further argued for a change to the understanding of state consent as dependent on
investor consent. Such a change would require that an investor show that he was not the national of the
respondent state at the time of the coming into effect of the instrument of state consent-in this case, the
BIT. Id. 64-65.
87. See Report of the Erecutive Directors on the Convention of Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of other States, reprinted in 1 ICSID Reports (R. Raytuse eds. Grottius 1993) 27 (Mar. 18, 1965).
88. Saipem v. Bangladesh, Decision on Jurisdiction & Recommendation on Provisional Measures, ICSID
Case No. ARB/05/07 (Mar. 21, 2007) [hereinafter Siapem].
89. Salini Construttori v. Morocco, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/04 (July 23, 2001)
[hereinafter Salini].
90. Saipent, supra note 88, 99.
91. Id. at n.22.
92. Id. %% 102-111.
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apply an "origin of capital" test to determine whether the claimants' investment qualified
under ICSID.93
Malaysian Historical Salvors v. Malaysia came to a different conclusion in the context of a
service contract for marine salvage of valuable Chinese porcelain from a shipwreck.94 The
sole arbitrator in that case surveyed prior awards analyzing Article 25(1) of the ICSID
Convention, including Salini. After discussing various approaches distilled from previous
decisions, the arbitrator applied "a fact-specific and holistic assessment" to determine
whether the hallmarks of investment-regularity of profit, contributions made, duration,
risk assumed, and contribution to the economic development of the host State-had been
met.95 The arbitrator concluded that "the weight of the authorities... swings in favour of
requiring a significant contribution to be made to the host State's economy. '96 Due to the
relative weakness of the other factors, the arbitrator found that the contribution require-
ment assumed "significant importance."97 In finding that a qualifying investment under
the ICSID Convention had not been made, the arbitrator accepted Malaysia's argument
that recovery of the shipwrecked porcelain brought benefits to Malaysia that were "largely
cultural and historical" rather than economic. 98 Malaysia Historical Salvors is at odds with a
2006 award that discounted the importance of "contribution to the host State's economic
development" as a factor in determining whether an investment qualified under ICSID.99
A commentator noted that the dismissal on jurisdictional grounds in Malaysian Historical
Salvors "is probably the most controversial award since the decision in the Salini case." 100
b. Qualifying Investments Under Investment Treaties
A tribunal constituted pursuant to NAFTA Chapter 11 wrestled with the jurisdictional
question of whether the treaty protected an investment located in the United States
against actions by Mexico.101 In Bayview v. Mexico, a group of Texas water districts argued
that NAFTA covered investments made in the United States by U.S. investors, which they
claimed that Mexico had undermined by diverting water from the Rio Grande River in
violation of a 1944 treaty.102 In addition, the claimants contended that they had made
investments in Mexico in the form of water rights guaranteed by the 1944 treaty.10 3 The
93. Siag, supra note 76, J 207. Saipem imposed a modest burden on the claimant to establish jurisdiction.
Citing a number of arbitral decisions and Judge Higgins's opinion in Cases Concerning Oil Platforms (Iran v.
United States), 1996 I.Cj. 902 (Dec. 12), the tribunal held that the party asserting jurisdiction bears a prima
facie burden of showing a breach of the treaty by alleging facts that, if established, could fall within the ambit
of the investment treaty. Saipem, supra note 88, 83-91.
94. Malaysian Historical Salvors SDN, BHD v. Malaysia, Award on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10
(May 17, 2007) [hereinafter Malaysian Historical Salvors].
95. Id. 107-125.
96. Id. 123-124.
97. Id. 1 132.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 123; See L.E.S.I. v. Algeria, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/3 fiuly 12, 2006)
[hereinafter L.E.SI.].
100. See Crina Baltag, Precedent on Notion of Investment: ICSID Award in MHS v. Malaysia, 4(5) Transnat'l
Disp. Mgmt. (2007).
101. Bayview Irrigation District v. Mexico, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/05/I fJune 19, 2007) [hereinaf-
ter Bayview].
102. Id. IT 43-47.
103. Id. IT 48-51.
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tribunal rejected both arguments. Although Chapter I l's reference to "investors of an-
other party" did not on its face limit NAFTA to protecting only foreign investors, 104 the
tribunal concluded that NAFTA protected only foreign investments. 105 The claimants
had invested in water distribution infrastructure, but those investments were in Texas, not
Mexico. That the actions of Mexico adversely affected an enterprise in Texas was insuffi-
cient to bring the investment within the protection of NAFTA. While not necessarily
determinative, the tribunal articulated a test for assessing the existence of a foreign invest-
ment under NAFTA: "that the investment is primarily regulated by the law of a State
other than the State of the investor's nationality, and this law is created and applied by
that State which is not the State of the investor's nationality."106
In Saipem, the tribunal considered whether rights embodied in an ICC arbitration
award constituted an investment under the Italy-Bangladesh BIT. Saipem had contracted
with the Bangladesh Oil Gas and Mineral Corporation (Petrobangla) to build a pipe-
line. 107 After Saipem took a dispute under the contract to ICC arbitration, Bangladeshi
courts enjoined Saipem from pursuing the arbitration and later nullified an award in
Saipem's favor.' 08 In the BIT arbitration, Saipem alleged that the actions of Petrobangla
and the Bangladeshi courts constituted expropriation. 109 The tribunal noted that it was an
open question whether the ICC award "itself qualifies as an investment." 10 Nevertheless,
it held that the "ICC Award crystallized the parties rights and obligations under the [pipe-
line] contract," and "the contract rights which are crystallized by the Award constitute an
investment within Article l(1)(c) of the BIT."' 1I
c. "Acceptance of Investment in Accordance with Law"
Tribunals frequently encounter BITs that require investments, as a definitional matter,
to comply with local law. In Fraport v. Philippines, an ICSID tribunal examined a clause in
the Germany-Philippines BIT that defined investment as "any kind of asset accepted in
accordance with the respective laws and regulations of either Contracting State."'" 2
The Fraport majority found that it lacked jurisdiction because the investor-through
the secret exercise of managerial control over a Filipino corporation that had won an
airport terminal concession-had violated the Philippines so-called "Anti-Dummy Law,"
which restricts foreign ownership of public utilities. The majority determined that
104. ld. 1 88 (citing North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 1139, Dec. 17, 1992, 32
I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]).
105. Id. IT 96, 101, 105 (citing NAFTA, art. 1139, 1101(a)).
106. Id. 1 98.
107. Saipem, supra note 88, '1 6-7.
108. Id. 9 31-36.
109. Id. 1 61. The tribunal also determined that interference with the ICC Arbitration by the courts of
Bangladesh, which deprived Saipem of sums of money due under the contract, could amount to expropria-
tion. Id. IT 129-3 2. The tribunal reserved for the merits stage the questions of whether Petrobangla's acts
were attributable to Bangladesh and whether the conduct of the courts should be characterized as a denial of
justice claim for purposes of the exhaustion of local remedies requirement. Id. 11 143, 152-53.
110. Id. 127.
111. Id.
112. Fraport AG Frankfirt Airport Servs. v. Philippines, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, 335 (Aug. 16,
2007) (citing Germany-Philippines BIT, Art. 1(1)) [hereinafter Fraport]. See Eric Luke Peterson, Divided
ICSID Panel Declines Jurisdiction Over Philippines Airport Temninal Case, ItvEsTMENrT- TREAT'y NEWS, August
30, 2007 at 6, available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2007/tn-aug30_2OO7.pdf.
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Fraport knew that in order to qualify for BIT protection its investment had to be "in
accordance with the host state's law;" local counsel had warned it that the management
structure "would violate a serious provision of Philippines law;" and Fraport understood
that the investment would not turn a profit unless it exerted secret managerial control "in
a way which [it] knew were [sic] not in accordance with the law of the Philippines."' 13
In a strongly worded dissent, Bernando Cremades argued that Fraport's conduct did
not contravene the Anti-Dummy Law and, even if it did, any violations of that law did not
deprive Fraport of protection under the BITJ 14 He acknowledged that illegal conduct by
investors was a serious matter, but one that was properly reserved for the merits phase.' 15
For Dr. Cremades, the jurisdictional inquiry was properly limited to "determining
whether the type of asset is legal in domestic law."'" 6 Otherwise, the dissent worried, "the
phrase 'according to the laws and regulations of the Host State' might provide the Achilles
Heel of investment arbitration if jurisdiction depends on the Claimant passing a full legal
compliance audit." 117 Dr. Cremades implied that Fraport had grounds for seeking an
annulment because the majority decision was "fundamentally wrong in its approach to
illegality."' Is
Another tribunal clarified that, to defeat jurisdiction, the illegality must be related to the
investor's actions in entering into the investment. 19 In Kardassopoulos v. Georgia, Georgia
argued that state-owned enterprises had exceeded their authority and that the agreements
were therefore "void ab initio" under Georgian law.12° Acknowledging that the ordinary
meaning of the relevant clause-"consistent with Georgia's [the host state's] legisla-
tion"-supported Georgia's interpretation, the tribunal nevertheless determined that the
treaty's object and purpose of providing "broad protection for investors and their invest-
ments" prevented the host state from invoking its own unlawful conduct to defeat jurisdic-
tion.' 21 The tribunal also justified its decision by reference to the law of state
responsibility, pointing out that an act in excess of governmental authority is nevertheless
attributable to the state under international law.122
3. Dispute with A Contracting State
The issue of whether the conduct giving rise to the investment dispute is attributable to
the host state has arisen with some frequency in recent years.' 23 In 2007, a NAFTA panel
addressed whether the actions of Canada's postal monopoly were attributable to Ca-
113. Id. J 398.
114. Id., Dissent, § 13.
115. Id., Dissent, §§ 14, 35, 38, 40.
116. Id., Dissent, § 38 (emphasis added).
117. Id., Dissent, § 37.
118. Id., Dissent, § 41.
119. Kardassopoulos v. Georgia, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/18 Ouly 6, 2007) [herein-
after Kardassopoulos].
120. Id. 1 142.
121. Id. 14, 181-84.
122. Id. IT 190-91.
123. See, e.g., Eureko B.V. v. Republic of Poland, Partial Award, Ad Hoc Arbitral Tribunal (Aug. 19, 2005)
[hereinafter Eurekol.
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nada. 124 United Parcel Service (UPS) alleged that Canada had breached its national treat-
ment and minimum standard of treatment obligations under Articles 1102 and 1105 based
on certain anti-competitive practices employed by Canada Post. 125 The tribunal deter-
mined, however, that NAFTA's regulation of monopolies and state enterprises (embodied
in Articles 1502 and 1503) displaced the default rule that a state is responsible for the acts
of its organs, as articulated in Article 4 of the International Law Commission's Draft
Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts. 126 By distinguishing
between the "Parties" on the one hand, and "monopolies" or "state enterprises" on the
other, the text of Articles 1502 and 1503 established a lex specialis attribution regime. 127
Thus:
The governments which negotiated and agreed to NAFTA did not simply and di-
rectly apply the rather generally stated obligations of Chapter 11 to government and
other monopolies and to State enterprises as well as to themselves. Rather they elab-
orated a more detailed set of provisions about competition, monopolies and State
enterprises and incorporated them in a distinct chapter (chapter 15) of the
Agreement.128
The tribunal also rejected the argument that Canada Post exercised elements of "govern-
mental authority" and thus declined to attribute its conduct to Canada under Article 5 of
the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility.
4. Timeliness
Whether a treaty claim is too late or too early was once again an important issue in
2007. In Eastern Sugar v. Czech Republic, the tribunal faced the novel issue of whether the
Czech Republic's accession to the E.U. terminated the Dutch-Czech BIT, rendering the
BIT claims untimely 129. Relying in part on Article 59 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties (governing treaty termination), the Czech Republic argued that the
BIT was no longer applicable after its date of accession to the E.U.130 Declining to refer
the dispute to the European Court of Justice, the tribunal rejected the argument. Finding
that neither the E.U. Accession Treaty nor the BIT addressed the question, the tribunal
analyzed the requirements of Article 59 of the Vienna Convention. The tribunal deter-
mined that E.U. law and the BIT did not cover the same subject matter. In particular, the
tribunal noted that the BIT's dispute resolution clause-guaranteeing access to a neutral
arbitration panel-was a key element absent from the E.U. regime.' 3' The tribunal also
124. United Parcel Serv. of America Inc. v. Canada, Award on the Merits, UNCITRAL (NAFTA) (May 24,
2007) [hereinafter United Parcel Serv.].
125. Id. 1 45-46.
126. Id. T 59; Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, U.N. Doc.
No. A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility].
127. United Parcel Serv., supra note 124, 1 59 (citing ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note
126, at art. 55).
128. Id. (citing NAFTA, at art. 1502, 1503).
129. Eastern Sugar B.V. v. Czech Republic, Partial Award, SCC No. 088/2004, UNCITRAL (March 27, 2007)
[hereinafter Eastern Sugar].
130. Id. 1 97-110; see Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 59, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331 (later concluded treaty must have same subject matter as earlier treaty) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
131. Eastern Sugar, supra note 129, 11 165-166.
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found that the dispute arose before the Czech Republic's accession to the E.U. "and could
not have been affected if the BIT had been terminated after that [date]."1 32
Rejecting the argument that a claim was in effect premature, the Kardassopoulos tribunal
decided that the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) applied provisionally and thus bound state
parties prior to its entry into force. 33 The award's discussion is important because provi-
sional application of the ECT is at issue in several closely watched treaty arbitrations. 134
In Kardassopoulos, Georgia argued that the ECT had not entered into force when the dis-
pute arose and that the municipal laws of Georgia and Greece did not allow for the provi-
sional application of treaties. 135 Article 45(1) of the ECT provides that "[ejach signatory
agrees to apply this Treaty provisionally pending its entry into force."1 36 The use of the
phrase "this Treaty," the tribunal concluded, required the provisional application of the
entire ECT.137 In addition, Article 45's requirement that provisional application be "not
inconsistent with [the signatory's] constitution, laws or regulations"-an exception to pro-
visional application-did not bar the claim because neither Greece nor Georgia at the
relevant times prohibited the provisional application of treaties as a matter of domestic
law.' 38
Article 45 of the ECT is unusual because treaties do not typically provide for provi-
sional application. As a result, parties seeking to broaden the temporal reach of invest-
ment treaties frequently argue that the wrongful acts constitute a continuing or composite
course of conduct. 139 In M.C. Power Group v. Ecuador,140 the tribunal found that acts that
began before, but continued after, the entry into force of the Argentina-Ecuador BIT
were nevertheless outside the tribunal's jurisdiction.141 Prior events could only be consid-
ered "for purposes of understanding the background, the causes, or scope of violations of
the BIT that occurred after its entry into force." 142 The tribunal also determined that the
obligation of a state party not to defeat the object and purpose of a treaty after signature
but before its entry into force did not trigger the retroactive application of the BIT 143 and
that the claimant could not rely on a "Most Favored Nation" clause to receive the protec-
tions offered by the earlier- concluded Argentina-Ecuador BIT.144
132. Id. % 176.
133. K(ardassopoulos, supra note 119, 1 202-03; see Vienna Convention, art. 25(1).
134. The main arbitrations in question are Yukos Universal Ltd. (UK-Isle of Man) v. Russian Federation;
Hulley Enterprises Ltd. (Cyprus) v. Russian Federation; and Veteran Petroleum Trust (Cyprus) v. Russian Federation.
135. Kardassopoulos, supra note 119, 71-79.
136. Id. %J 202 (quoting The Energy Charter Treaty, art. 45(1), Dec. 17, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 360 (emphasis
added) [hereinafter ECT]).
137. Id. 12 10.
138. Id. 1 246.
139. See ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 126, at art. 14, 15.
140. M.C.L Power Group L.C. v. Ecuador, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/6 (July 31, 2007).
141. Id. 1% 66, 97.
142. Id. J 93.
143. Id. 116.
144. Id. %% 127-128. In SociedadAndnima Eduardo Vieira v. Chile, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/7 (Aug.
21, 2007), the tribunal similarly determined that the dispute arose before the entry of the BIT. In dissent,
Susana B. Czar de Zalduendo argued that the tribunal had jurisdiction over those claims arising out of a new
dispute after the effective date of the BIT. See Fernando Cabrera Diaz, Majority Declines Jurisdiction Against
Chile, INVESTMEN-T TREATY NEWS, August 30, 2007 at 9, available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2007/itnaug
30_2007.pdf.
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In contrast, the tribunal in United Parcel Service rejected Canada's argument that the
claims were time-barred under NAFTA's three-year limitation period. 45 The tribunal
held that "continuing courses of conduct constitute continuing breaches of legal obliga-
tions and renew the limitation period accordingly."' 46 Thus, UPS was entitled to bring
claims related to conduct that "began before and extended past three years before a claim
was filed." 147 UPS bore the burden, however, of establishing losses within the limitation
period because a "continuing course of conduct might generate losses of a different di-
mension at different times." 4 8
B. PROCEDURE
1. Cballenges to Arbitrators
Despite a variety of grounds raised by parties, there were no successful arbitrator chal-
lenges in 2007. One of the more unusual grounds for challenge involved an abitrator
who was serving as counsel for a party in another arbitration involving similar legal issues.
In Eureko v. Poland,149 Poland requested that the Brussels Court of Appeals remove Judge
Stephen Schwebel from the tribunal shortly after it issued a partial award on liability.150
Poland's request related to the relationship between Judge Schwebel and the law firm
Sidley Austin, which represents a claimant in an unrelated arbitration against Poland and
serves as co-counsel with Judge Schwebel in the ivendi v. Argentina arbitration.' 15 Po-
land argued that acting as an arbitrator in a case against Poland while having ties to a law
firm representing a claimant in another case against Poland cast doubt on Judge Schwe-
bel's impartiality. 5 2 Poland also pointed out that Judge Schwebel and Sidley Austin, act-
ing as co-counsel in ivendi, asserted legal arguments that were premised on the partial
award coauthored by Judge Schwebel in Eureko.153 The Belgian court was not convinced
that Judge Schwebel's work with Sidley Austin would undermine his impartiality in the
Eureko arbitration.
Similarly, in Grand River Enterprises v. United States, an ongoing NAFTA arbitration,
the United States challenged Professor James Anaya on the ground that he represented or
assisted parties adverse to United States in matters before the Commission on the Elimi-
nation of Racial Discrimination (CERD) and the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights (IAC).154 ICSID took the view that "representing or assisting" parties adverse to
145. United Parcel Serv., supra note 124, 1 28.
146. Id.
147. Id. 29.
148. Id. 9J 30.
149. Eureko, supra note 123.
150. The Republic of Poland v. Eureko BV, Case No RG 2006/1542/A, Court of First Instance of Brussels (4th
Chamber); see also Damon Vis-Dunbar & Luke Eric Peterson, Belgian Appeals Court Rejects Poland's Challenge
to Arbitrator in Eureko Case, INVESTMENT TREAT'Y NEWS, Nov. 15, 2007, at 3, available at http://www.iisd.
org/pdf/2007/in-novl 5_2007.pdf.
151. Compapid de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. v. Argentina, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3 (Aug. 20, 2007).
152. Vis-Dunbar & Peterson, supra note 150 at 3.
153. Id.
154. Letter from Nassib G. Ziade, Deputy Secretary Gen., Int'l Ctr. of Inv. Disputes, to Prof. James Anaya
(Nov. 28, 2007), available at http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/USA/GrandRiver/GRE-USA-Anaya-
Challenge-28-11-07.pdf.
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United States before CERD and the TAC "would be incompatible with simultaneous ser-
vice as arbitrator in the NAFTA proceeding."'5 Upon ICSID's request, however, Profes-
sor Anaya informed ICSID that he had ceased his work before the IAC and CERD but
continued to work as an instructor in a law school clinic on matters concerning indigenous
peoples and the CERD. Observing that "[a] reasonable distinction can be made between :
[(1)] representing parties in international fora where the underlying aim is similar to the
aim of the current arbitration ...and [(2]) supervising students as part of a clinical
course," ICSID found that Prof. Anaya's work did not "give rise to justifiable doubts as to
impartiality or independence" and denied the United States' request. 156
2. Amicus Curiae and Non-Party Participation
In Biwater Gauff v. Tanzania,15 7 a group of non-governmental organizations sought ami-
cus curiae status and an opportunity to submit briefs, access case documents, and attend the
hearing. The tribunal noted at the outset that the ICSID Rules do not provide for an
amicus curiae status insofar as this "might be taken to denote a standing in the overall
arbitration akin to that of a party," and explained that the ICSID Rules allow only two
specific and carefully delineated types of participation: filing of written submissions and
attendance at hearings.IS8 The tribunal then granted permission for the group to file a
written submission, noting that such submissions had the "reasonable potential" to assist
the tribunal and that allowing such submissions was "an important element in the overall
discharge of the Arbitral Tribunal's mandate and in securing wider confidence in the arbi-
tral process itself."' 59 The tribunal denied the petitioners' request to attend oral hearings
on the ground that one of the parties objected,160 and denied the request for access to key
arbitration documents on the ground that the proper role of an amicus curiae is not to
rebut the arguments of the parties or to suggest how the tribunal ought to determine
issues of fact or law presented, but to provide a broader policy perspective. 16'
In Suez v. Argentina, the tribunal granted permission to a group of NGOs to file an
amicus curiae brief after finding that they had "expertise, experience, and independence"
and that the "case presented an appropriate subject matter for an amicus submission be-
cause it involved matters of public interest."162 The tribunal denied the petitioners' re-
quest for "timely, sufficient, and unrestricted access to all the documents" since they had




157. Biwater GauffLtd. v. Tanzania, Procedural Order No. 6, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22 (Apr. 25, 2007).
158. Id. 1 46.
159. Id. 50.
160. Id. 70-71.
161. Id. 1 63-65.
162. Suez v. Argentina, Order in Response to Amicus Petition, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19 (Feb. 12, 2007).
163. Id.
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3. Provisional Measures
In 2007, tribunals again proved reluctant to award provisional measures, granting such
relief only in the Saipem case. 164 After an ICC tribunal ordered Petrobangla, the Ban-
gladeshi state-owed entity, to pay certain retention money and return a warranty bond to
Saipem, the Bangladeshi courts refused to enforce the award. Saipem then instituted an
ICSID arbitration seeking return of the warranty bond and retention money.16 5 Finding a
risk that Petrobangla might draw on the warranty bond while keeping the retention
money, the ICSID tribunal, after determining that there was "both necessity and urgency"
and a risk of irreparable harm with respect to the warranty bond, "recommend[ed] that
Bangladesh take the steps necessary to ensure that Petrobangla refrain from encashing the
Warranty Bond." 166 The tribunal, however, dismissed Saipem's request for return of the
retention money because such a payment was not necessary and urgent and because the
granting of the request would have amounted to "a defacto enforcement of part of the ICC
Award." 167 The tribunal explained that it was "prepared to recommend measures prevent-
ing an increase of the harm allegedly suffered by one of the parties, [but] not inclined to
recommend measures guaranteeing an award in favour of Saipem." 16s
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) rejected Uruguay's request for provisional
measures in its dispute with Argentina over the construction of pulp mills on the River
Uruguay. 169 The ICJ found that public protests and blockades erected by Argentine
protestors posed no imminent risk of irreparable prejudice to Uruguay's rights and de-
clined Uruguay's demand that Argentina be ordered to take all reasonable and appropriate
steps at its disposal "to 'prevent or end the interruption of transit' between the two [coun-
tries].' 170 The ICJ similarly declined Uruguay's demand that Argentina be ordered to
abstain from any measure that might "aggravate, extend or make more difficult the settle-
ment" of the dispute" or which might "prejudice the rights of Uruguay in dispute before
the Court," on the ground that there was no risk of irreparable prejudice to the rights of
Uruguay in the dispute before the ICJ.17 1
The ICSID tribunal in Occidental Petroleum v. Ecuador set a high bar for claimants seek-
ing to obtain provisional remedies. 172 Contesting Ecuador's termination of a contract to
carry out oil exploration and exploitation activities in the Amazon, Occidental petitioned
the tribunal to enjoin Ecuador from assigning its rights to a third party and to order
Ecuador to mitigate further damages. Reciting the well established standard that provi-
sional remedies will only be granted where it is "necessary to preserve a party's rights and
where the need is urgent in order to avoid irreparable harm," 73 the tribunal found that
164. Saipem, supra note 88.
165. 1d. 34-36.
166. Id. T 182, Recommendation.
167. Id. 185.
168. Id.
169. Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures,
2007 I.CJ. 135 (Jan. 23).
170. Id. 1 41-43.
171. Id. 'l 44, 66.
172. Occidental Petroleum Carp. v. Republic of Ecuador, Decision on Provisional Matters, ICSID Case No.
ARB/06/11 (Aug. 17, 2007) (hereinafter Occidental Petroleum].
173. Id. T 59 (emphasis in original).
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Occidental had not established "a strongly arguable case that there exists a right to specific
performance where a natural resources concession agreement has been terminated or can-
celled by a sovereign State."174 In rejecting the request for specific performance, the tri-
bunal further reasoned that "[p]rovisional measures are not meant to protect against any
potential or hypothetical harm susceptible to result from uncertain actions." 175 Finally,
with respect to mitigation of damages, the tribunal recognized the utility of provisional
measures to avoid aggravation of a dispute, but noted that provisional measures "are not
designed to merely mitigate the final amount of damages." 176 The tribunal reasoned that
Occidental was not seeking "to avoid aggravation of the dispute per se, but rather aggrava-
tion of the monetary damages resulting from an already existing dispute." 177 The tribunal
therefore denied both of Occidental's requests for provisional measures.
C. DECISIONS ON THE MERITS
1. Fair and Equitable Treatment
Numerous merits awards in 2007 adjudicated claims for breach of "fair and equitable
treatment" provisions. These awards will contribute to the further development and re-
finement of fair and equitable treatment standards, particularly with respect to the concept
of legitimate expectations. The awards also show that tribunals continue to wresde with
the overlap between customary international law and treaty provisions requiring fair and
equitable treatment.
In Enron v. Argentina, the tribunal revisited the question of whether fair and equitable
treatment under a BIT requires something more than meeting the minimum standard
owed under customary international law. 178 Citing the recent evolution of the doctrine,
the tribunal held that fair and equitable treatment under an investment treaty was broader
and thus "can also require a treatment additional to, or beyond that of, customary law."
1 79
The tribunal noted that the goal of a stable framework for investment was enshrined in
the BIT's preamble and was therefore "a key element" of fair and equitable treatment
under the treaty.' s0 This view was further supported by recent decisions in which the
concept of a stable legal and regulatory environment had become "an emerging standard
of fair and equitable treatment under international law."' s' The tribunal also noted that
the requirement of a stable framework for investment was closely related to a state's obli-
gation to protect the legitimate expectations taken into account by a foreign investor at
174. Id. 86.
175. Id. TJ 87-89.
176. Id. '1 97.
177. Id. 98.
178. Enron Corp. & Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentina, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3 (May 22, 2007)
[hereinafter Enron].
179. Id. 258. The Tribunal in this context referred to the role that should be played by general principles
of law in giving further definition to treatment standards. Id. 257. For a recent discussion of the fair and
equitable treatment standard and how it could be developed further in the context of analyzing it as a general
principle of law, see Elizabeth Snodgrass, Protecting Investor's Legitimate Expectations-Recognizing and Delimit-
ing a General Principle, 21 ICSID REv. 1 (2006).
180. Enron, snpra note 178, T 259.
181. Id. 260 (quoting LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentina, Decision on Liability, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1
(Oct. 3, 2006) [hereinafter LG&E]).
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the time of investment. The essential considerations were "that these expectations derived
from the conditions that were offered by the State to the investor at the time of invest-
ment and that such conditions were relied upon by the investor when deciding to in-
vest." 8 2 The tribunal also rejected the contention that a violation of the fair and equitable
treatment standard required a showing that the state acted in bad faith.18 3
While noting that fair and equitable treatment does not require "the freezing of the
legal system or the disappearance of the regulatory power of the State," 184 the tribunal
held that Argentina's response to the financial crisis "substantially changed the legal and
business framework under which the investment was decided and implemented," thus vio-
lating the treaty. 8 5 In particular, the tribunal cited specific guarantees made to investors
during the privatization of Argentina's gas sector, including promises that tariffs would be
calculated in U.S. dollars, would be indexed to inflation and would not be subject to freez-
ing and price controls without compensation. Because Enron had reasonably relied upon
these conditions when investing, Argentina's dismantling of this tariff regime constituted
an objective breach of the treaty's requirement of fair and equitable treatment.'8 6 A simi-
lar analysis was set forth in Sempra v. Argentina, which also found that Argentina had
breached the fair and equitable treatment provision of the treaty through its overhaul of
the gas tariff system. 8 7
In Siemens v. Argentina, the tribunal emphasized that "bad faith or malicious intention"
was not a necessary element in a claim for breach of a fair and equitable treatment provi-
sion.188 The tribunal similarly rejected the contention that fair and equitable treatment
only required meeting the minimum standard under international law. In particular, the
tribunal noted that customary law on this issue had evolved and that the relevant consider-
ation was the state of customary law at the time the specific investment treaty was en-
tered. 189 According to the tribunal, the current international standard of fair and
equitable treatment includes the duty to protect an investor's legitimate expectations at
the time it made the investment. 190 On that basis, the tribunal found a violation of the fair
and equitable treatment provision of the BIT.
Likewise, the tribunal in ivendi v. Argentina rejected the notion that fair and equitable
treatment only required meeting the minimum standard under international law.191 Ac-
cording to the tribunal, there was no basis in the language of the treaty to limit fair and
equitable treatment to the minimum standard, and the reference to "principles of interna-
tional law" in the treaty "invites consideration of a wider range of international law princi-
ples than the minimum standard alone," including contemporary principles. 192 The
182. Id. 1 262.
183. Id. 263.
184. Id. 1 261.
185. Id. 264.
186. Id. 191 264-68.
187. Sempra Energy Int'l v. Argentina, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, 9 296-304 (Sept. 28, 2007) [here-
inafter Sempral.
188. Siemens A.G. v. Argentina, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/08 (Feb. 6, 2007) [hereinafter Siemens).
189. Id. T 293-300.
190. Id. 1 299.
191. Compafid de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. & Vivendi Universal v. Argentina, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/
97/3 (Aug. 20, 2000) [hereinafter Vivend:].
192. Id. 1 7.4.7.
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tribunal reaffirmed that fair and equitable treatment was an objective standard requiring
that, "in all of the circumstances of the particular case, the conduct properly attributable
to the state has been fair and equitable," and that this objective standard did not allow for
considerations of good faith. 193
The tribunal in Parkerings-Compagniet v. Lithuania'94 devoted extensive discussion to
the concept of legitimate expectations in determining whether Lithuania had breached its
obligation of "equitable and reasonable treatment" under the Norway-Lithuania BIT.
195
The tribunal stated that expectations are legitimate when the state has made explicit guar-
antees or implicit assurances at the time of investment. Even in the absence of such guar-
antees, "an investor has a right to a certain stability and predictability of the legal
environment of the investment." 196 Because the state retains its sovereign legislative
power, however, "an investor must anticipate that the circumstances could change, and
thus structure its investment in order to adapt it to the potential changes of legal environ-
ment." 197 Thus, the tribunal held that ongoing regulatory changes should have been rea-
sonably expected during Lithuania's transition to a market economy. Because the parties
had not included a stabilization clause in their contract, the investor had assumed the
business risk that Lithuania might pass legislative or regulatory measures that harmed its
investment.198
In contrast, the tribunal in PSEG Global v. Turkey held that the "roller-coaster effect" of
Turkey's continuing legislative changes had breached the fair and equitable treatment ob-
ligation. 199 Although investors cannot reasonably expect that the legal environment will
remain totally unchanged, an investor's basic expectations of stability cannot be met "in a
situation where the law kept changing continuously and endlessly." 2
00
2. Expropriation
Claimants frequently assert expropriation claims in conjunction with claims for breach
of fair and equitable treatment provisions. Indeed, the two types of claims often have
significant overlap, especially when the expropriation claim is for indirect expropriation,
rather than direct expropriation involving outright nationalization or confiscation of prop-
erty. Nevertheless, the awards from 2007 show that it is much more difficult to prevail on
indirect expropriation claims as opposed to fair and equitable treatment claims.
For instance, the Sempra tribunal noted that "on occasion the line separating the breach
of the fair and equitable treatment standard from an indirect expropriation can be very
thin." 201 Nevertheless, the tribunal believed that "judicial prudence and deference to
193. Id. 1 7.4.12.
194. Parkerings-CompagnietAS v. Lithuania, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8 (Sept. 11, 2007) [hereinafter
Parkerings].
195. The tribunal held that there was no significant difference between standards of "equitable and reasona-
ble" treatment and "fair and equitable" treatment and therefore would interpret the two interchangeably. See
id. TT 276-78.
196. Id. T 333.
197. Id.
198. See id. TT 335-38.
199. PSEG Global v. Turkey, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/5 (Jan. 19, 2007) (hereinafter PSEG Global].
200. Id. 254.
201. Sempra, spra note 187, T 301.
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State functions are better served by opting for a determination in the light of the fair and
equitable treatment standard." 20 2 Accordingly, the tribunal rejected Sempra's expropria-
tion claim, finding that there had been no showing of "substantial deprivation" such that
the regulatory measures had deprived the investor of control of its business or left the
value of the business virtually annihilated.203 Indirect expropriation claims were rejected
for similar reasons in Enron204 and PSEG Global205 In all three cases, the fair and equita-
ble treatment claims were successful while the indirect expropriation claims failed.
An indirect expropriation claim was also rejected in Parkerings.206 In determining
whether a state's wrongful termination of contract could rise to an expropriation, the tri-
bunal held that three conditions needed to be met. First, the state must have acted in its
sovereign capacity, rather than as a mere contracting party.207 Second, the investor must
have been deprived of the ability to seek redress before the appropriate domestic court.208
Third, the termination must have resulted in a substantial decrease in the value of the
investment. 20 9 Because Lithuania had been acting merely as a contracting party when it
terminated the contract, and because the investor had not sought relief in the Lithuanian
courts pursuant to the contract's forum selection clause, the tribunal found that no expro-
priation occurred.
Fireman's Fund Insurance v. Mexico produced another decision in which a claim for indi-
rect expropriation was rejected. 210 In analyzing whether Mexico's actions in connection
with the unsuccessful recapitalization plan for a failing bank had resulted in an expropria-
tion under Article 1110 of NAFTA, the tribunal looked to customary international law
and previous NAFTA cases for guidance. The tribunal set forth a comprehensive list of
factors it would consider in analyzing the claim. In particular, the tribunal stated that an
expropriation requires a taking by a governmental entity of an investment covered by
NAFTA; covered investments include tangible and intangible property; the taking must
result in a substantially complete deprivation of the use and enjoyment of the property;
the taking must be permanent; the taking need not involve a transfer of ownership; the
effects of the state's actions, not the state's intent, are dispositive; the taking may be dejure
or defacto; the taking may be direct or indirect; the taking may result from a single mea-
sure or a series of measures (so-called creeping expropriation); and the investor's reasona-
ble expectations may be considered. 211 The tribunal also distinguished compensable
expropriation and non-compensable state regulation based on whether the measure was
within the recognized police powers of the state, the public purpose and effect of the
measure, whether the measure was discriminatory, the proportionality between the in-
tended goal and the means employed, and the bona fide nature of the measure. 212 On the
facts, the tribunal held that no expropriation had occurred.
202. Id.
203. See id. 11 285-86.
204. Enron, spra note 178, J 244-46.
205. PSEG Global, supra note 199, 11 278-80.
206. Parkerings, supra note 194.
207. See id. 9191 443-47.
208. See id. 191 448-54.
209. See id. 1 455.
210. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Mexico, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/02/1 (uly 17, 2007).
211. See id. 91 176.
212. See id. 91 1760).
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In contrast to these awards, indirect expropriation was found to have occurred in two
merits decisions in 2007. In ivendi, the tribunal concluded that the provincial govern-
ment's actions in unilaterally lowering water tariffs and mounting a campaign against the
water concessionaire aimed at reversing the privatization of the water sector, ultimately
resulting in termination of the Concession Agreement, constituted an indirect expropria-
tion.213 In particular, the tribunal held that as a result of the state's measures, the conces-
sionaire "was effectively deprived of the right to operate the concession and to be
compensated in accordance with the Concession Agreement." 214 The tribunal also re-
jected Argentina's claim that a measure should be presumed regulatory absent a finding of
bad faith, holding that "the effect of the measure on the investor, not the state's intent, is
the critical factor. '215 The tribunal did not reach the question of whether the actions were
taken for a public purpose; since no compensation had been paid, the question of purpose
was irrelevant under the terms of the treaty. 216
In the second decision, the Siemens tribunal found that Argentina had committed an
indirect expropriation when it terminated Siemens' contractual rights to implement and
run a national identification system. 217 In reaching this conclusion, the tribunal held that
only the effects of the government's actions need be considered, not the state's intent to
expropriate. 218 The tribunal held that the state had clearly violated the terms of the treaty
because no compensation had been paid for the expropriation. 219
3. Full Protection and Security
Also closely related to fair and equitable treatment is the obligation to provide "full
protection and security." In general, tribunals have been unwilling to extend this standard
of treatment beyond the duty to provide physical protection for an investor's property and
personnel. This trend largely continued in 2007, as three awards rejected attempts to
construe "full protection and security" clauses as requiring a broader legal security for
investments. 220 As the Enron tribunal noted:
[HIistorically this particular standard has been developed in the context of physical
protection and security of the company's officials, employees or facilities. The Tribu-
nal cannot exclude as a matter of principle that there might be cases where a broader
interpretation could be justified, but then it becomes difficult to distinguish such situ-
ation from one resulting in the breach of fair and equitable treatment, and even from
some form of expropriation.2 21
Two decisions offered broader interpretations. In Siemens, the tribunal found that Ar-
gentina had violated the full protection and security provision of the treaty by pushing for
213. Vivendi, snpra note 191.
214. Id. 1 7.5.19.
215. Id. 1 7.5.20 (emphasis in original).
216. Id. T 7.5.2 1.
217. Siemens, supra note 188.
218. Id. T 270.
219. Id. T 273.
220. See PSEG Global, supra note 199, 257-59; Enron, supra note 178, 284-87; Sempra, supra note 187,
321-24.
221. Enron, supra note 178, 286.
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contractual renegotiation for the sole purpose of reducing its costs, without any declara-
tion of public purpose.222 The tribunal, however, noted that the relevant BIT specifically
imposed an obligation to provide legal security so that the scope of the obligation was
much broader than providing only physical security.22 3 In Vivendi,224 the tribunal likewise
declined to limit full security and protection to physical security, holding that the scope of
such a clause is congruent with the duty to provide fair and equitable treatment.2 25 Ac-
cording to the tribunal, security and protection "can apply to more than physical
security. " 226
4. National Treatment Standards
In United Parcel Service, a divided tribunal held that Canada did not breach its NAFTA
obligations by allowing Canada Post, the national postal monopoly, to engage in discrimi-
natory and anti-competitive practices.2 27 In particular, the majority found that Canada
did not breach the national treatment obligations under NAFTA Article 1102, which re-
quires NAIFTA parties to treat investors from other NAFTA states as favorably as domes-
tic investors. To establish breach of this obligation, it is necessary to show that foreign
and domestic investors were in "like circumstances" to one another. Here, the majority
held that Canada Post and UPS were not in like circumstances, highlighting various dif-
ferences between postal and courier service. 228 Significantly, the majority also held that
Canada's Publications Assistance Program qualified for the "cultural industries exception"
under NAFTA Article 2106.229
While accepting the majority's test for determining national treatment, the dissent
would have held that UPS and Canada Post were in fact in like circumstances. The dis-
sent believed that economic competition between the two entities, which involved com-
peting products and competition for market share, presented a prima facie case that they
were in like circumstances, which had not been rebutted by Canada. 230 The dissent would
also have found that Canada had violated Article 1102 by according UPS less favorable
treatment than Canada Post, including less favorable customs treatment, abuse of Canada
Post's monopoly infrastructure and less favorable treatment under the Publications Assis-
tance Program.23'
5. Umbrella Clauses
The debate over the scope of so-called "umbrella clauses" in BITs continued in 2007.
Under the broad interpretation of such provisions, which typically require parties to ob-
serve "any other obligation" entered into with respect to investments, any breach of con-
222. Siemens, supra note 188.
223. Id. 303-08.
224. Vivendi, supra note 191.
225. See id. 1 7.4.15.
226. See id. 1 7.4.17.
227. United Parcel Ser., stipra note 124.
228. Id. $$ 99-120.
229. Id. 1 137.
230. Id., Dissent and Concurrence, 1 18-52.
231. Id., Dissent and Concurrence, 1 63.
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tract between a state and an investor may be elevated into a breach of the treaty.2 32 Under
the narrow interpretation, umbrella clauses apply only to obligations of a state acting in its
sovereign rather than commercial capacity and thus do not include ordinary commercial
breaches of contract.2 33 Of the three awards considering this issue in 2007, two inclined
toward the broad approach. Both of those cases, however, involved Argentina acting in its
sovereign capacity, so the outcome would have been the same under the narrow approach
as well.
In Enron, the tribunal unequivocally adopted a broad interpretation of the umbrella
clause, noting that "the phrase 'any obligation' refers to obligations regardless of their
nature" and includes both contractual obligations and obligations assumed through law or
regulation.2 34 The only limitation on the scope of the umbrella clause was that the obliga-
tion must be "with regard to investments" pursuant to the language of the treaty.235 Ac-
cordingly, the tribunal held that Argentina had breached the umbrella clause through its
contract breaches and breaches of various obligations assumed through the legislation that
implemented the gas tariff regime. 236 This broad approach was also adopted in Siemens.
This view was only dicta, however, as the tribunal found that Siemens could not state a
claim under the umbrella clause because it was not a party to the relevant contract with
Argentina-its local subsidiary was. 2
37
In Sempra, the tribunal also found that Argentina violated the terms of the umbrella
clause but appeared to adopt a more limited approach. Specifically, the tribunal noted
that ordinary contract breaches by the state acting in its commercial capacity, rather than
in its sovereign capacity, would generally not qualify as breaches of the umbrella clause.238
The tribunal accordingly took pains to note that the relevant actions were not "mere
ordinary contractual breaches of a commercial nature" but rather the acts of a state as
sovereign.239
Further clouding this issue was the annulment decision in CMS Gas v. Argentina.2 40
Without recommending either approach, the annulment committee found "major difficul-
ties with [the tribunal's] broad interpretation."241 Nevertheless, the committee annulled
only a limited portion of the award on the ground that the tribunal failed to explain its
reasoning, without deciding if the tribunal manifestly exceeded its power.242
232. See, e.g., LG&E, supra note 181, 170; Eureko, supra note 123, T 256; SGS v. Philippines, Decision on
Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, '1 125-28 (Jan. 29, 2004).
233. See, e.g., Pan American Energy LLC v. Argentina, Decision on Preliminary Objections, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/13, 1J 108-10 (July 27, 2006); El Paso Energy Int'l v. Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID
Case No. ARB/03/15, '119 79-82 (Apr. 27, 2006); SGS v. Pakistan, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No.
ARB/O1/13, 19 171-73 (Aug. 9, 2003 ).
234. Enron, snpra note 178, 9 274.
235. Id.
236. Id. 9] 275-77.
237. Siemens, supra note 188, 1 204-06.
238. Sempra, supra note 187, 1 310.
239. Id. 9 311.
240. CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina, Annulment Decision, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8 (Sept. 25,
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6. The Necessity Defense
Three major decisions in 2007 addressed the "state of necessity" defense. All three
decisions concerned the Argentine financial crisis and will surely be considered in the
numerous other ICSID disputes concerning Argentina's actions during that period. Pre-
viously, the tribunals in CMS243 and LG&E 244 had reached inconsistent decisions on
whether Argentina had a legitimate necessity defense for actions taken during the cur-
rency crisis. While the LG&E tribunal held that a state of necessity existed for a seven-
teen-month period beginning in late 2001, the CMS tribunal rejected this defense based
on substantially the same facts.
In Enron, the tribunal once again considered Argentina's necessity defense for actions
taken during the crisis.245 Although the president of the Enron tribunal had also served as
president of the CMS tribunal, and one arbitrator had also served on the LG&E tribunal,
the award did not address the two previous decisions. Instead, the tribunal decided on the
facts that Argentina had not made out a valid necessity defense under customary interna-
tional law or the terms of the treaty. In particular, the tribunal doubted that Argentina's
actions were the only means of safeguarding its essential interest and also suggested that
Argentina had contributed to the situation of necessity.246
In Sempra, the tribunal likewise rejected Argentina's necessity defense under both the
treaty and customary international law. 247 Unlike Enron, however, the Sempra award ad-
dressed the previous decisions on the issue. The tribunal stated that although
the CMS and Enron tribunals have not been persuaded by the severity of the Argen-
tine crisis as a factor capable of triggering the state of necessity, LG&E has consid-
ered the situation in a different light and justified the invocation of emergency and
necessity, albeit for a limited period of time.248
The tribunal, however, was not persuaded that the crisis justified "the operation of
emergency and necessity" and reached the same result as the tribunals in CMS and En-
ron.
249 The annulment decision in CMS was issued shortly after the Sempra award. 250
Although the annulment committee criticized the tribunal's handling of the necessity de-
fense for failing to separately analyze the defense under the treaty as well as under custom-
ary international law, 251 it nevertheless held that it was without authority to correct the
tribunal's legal errors since it had not acted in manifest excess of its powers. 252
In light of this mixed record, Argentina is currently contemplating whether to ask the
United States for a written interpretation of the treaty confirming that the necessity provi-
243. CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/08 (May 12, 2005) [hereinaf-
ter CMS].
244. LG&E, supra note 181.
245. Enron, supra note 178.
246. See id. 305-13.
247. Sempra, supra note 187.
248. Id. T 346.
249. Id.
250. CMS Annulment Decision, supra note 240.
251. Id. 9 123, 131
252. Id. $9] 135-36.
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sion is in fact self-judging.25 3 It is unclear whether Argentina will be successful in reach-
ing an agreement with the United States on the interpretation of that provision.
Moreover, by operation of the Vienna Convention, it is also unclear whether tribunals
must give retroactive effect to such an agreement, or whether they should treat it as an
amendment of the treaty with only prospective effect.254 The Sempra tribunal has indi-
cated that it is the latter.255
D. DAMAGES
A number of tribunals granted substantial damages awards in 2007, including several
involving arbitrations against Argentina: US$217 million in Siemens v. Argentina; US$128
million in Sempra v. Argentina; US$105 million in Vivendi v. Argentina;256 US$106 million
in Enron v. Argentina; and US$57.4 million in LG&E v. Argentina. Although four of these
cases dealt at least in part with claims stemming from emergency legal and regulatory
measures taken by Argentina in the wake of the financial crisis, the tribunals varied in the
valuation methodology they applied and the extent to which they were willing to assign
Argentina the costs of the arbitration.
1. Valuation Methodology
All of the tribunals issuing damages awards followed the full reparation standard of
customary international law, as enunciated by the Permanent Court of International Jus-
tice in Factory at Chorzow,257 but they diverged in the method of quantification. The
LG&E tribunal noted the difficulty in accurately and fairly crafting a compensation award,
as "[t]hese questions are particularly thorny when it comes to defining the standard and
measure of compensation" and "pre-existing guidance in arbitral jurisprudence is very
limited."258 The tribunal concluded that when the applicable investment treaty does not
specify how to quantify compensation, arbitrators should consider it to be "the intention
of the parties 'to leave it open to tribunals to determine a measure of compensation appro-
priate to the specific circumstances of the case.' 259
a. Actual Loss vs. Fair Market Value
The majority of the tribunals issuing damages awards in 2007 sought to determine the
fair market value (FMV) of the claimant's investment as the appropriate measure of com-
253. See Shane Romig, Argentina Seeks Diplomatic Evitfrom ICSID Suits, DowJoNEs NEWS REPORT, Oct.
12, 2007.
254. See Vienna Convention, art. 33(3).
255. See Sempra, supra note 187, 191385-86.
256. ivendi, supra note 191.
257. Factory at Ckorzdsw (Germany v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.IJ. (ser. A) No 17, at 47 (Sept. 13, 1928) (stating that
reparations "must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the
situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed"). All the 2007
awards at least tacitly invoked the Factory at Cborzds standard. See Siemens, supra note 188, 349; LG&E
Energy Corp. v. Argentina, Award on Damages, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/l, 1 31 (July 25, 2007) [hereinafter
LG&E Damages Award]; Sempra, supra note 187, 1 400; Eastern Sugar, supra note 129, 1347; PSEG Global,
supra note 199, 281; rivendi, supra note 191, 1 8.1.1.
258. LGdrE Damages Award, supra note 257, 130.
259. Id. 40.
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pensation. In order to determine FM-V, the Enron tribunal took a painstaking, fact-spe-
cific approach. It started with the difference in value of Enron's investment before the
government's adverse action and the current value then made several adjustments to "re-
flect the reality of the crisis that took place in Argentina and the specific influence it has in
connection with valuation and compensation. ' 260 Likewise, the Siemens and Vivendi tribu-
nals focused on compensating for the lost value of the investment due to the government's
unlawful acts. Rather than going by strict book value, however, the tribunals scrutinized
the facts to ascertain the applicability of such factors as tax credits, profitability, debt fi-
nancing, and related investment expenses. 261
In contrast, the LG&E tribunal rejected LG&E's proposal to determine compensation
by assessing the FMV of its investment. The tribunal noted that the FMV approach is
only "appropriate in cases of expropriation in which the claimants have lost the title to
their investment or when interference with property rights has led to a loss equivalent to
the total loss of investment." 262 Instead, the tribunal held that the appropriate method
was based on the "actual losses incurred as a result of the internationally wrongful act. ' 263
In calculating the actual loss, the tribunal reasoned that the guiding question should be
one of causation-that is, "what did the investor lose by reason of the unlawful acts?" 264
Ultimately, the tribunal's damages award reflected the fact that LG&E had been able to
recoup much of its initial losses, thus compensating for "the dividends that would or could
have been generated without any change in the [Argentine] tariff system. 2 65 Dividends
received by LG&E from its investment were accordingly subtracted from the damages
awarded by the tribunal.
b. Compensation for Future Lost Profits
Damages awards in 2007 also differed in their treatment of compensation for future lost
profits. Interestingly, only the tribunal in Enron allowed a full evaluation of future profits
in its compensation valuation. Citing "established international practice" for doing so, the
tribunal ruled that a fair valuation of the investment at issue "should include the measure
of its future prospects. '266 In contrast, the LG&E tribunal denied a claim for $174 million
in future damages running from January 2008 until the expiration of gas distribution li-
censes in 2027. The tribunal conceded that LG&E faced continuing breaches of the
treaty, but reasoned that it could only award compensation for losses that are certain. 267
Because future losses were too uncertain, the tribunal declined to provide compensation
for them. Reaching the same conclusion, the Vivendi tribunal accepted in principle that
future lost profits were relevant to its valuation of damages, but found that such profits
had not been established "with a sufficient degree of certainty." 268 The PSEG Global tri-
260. Enron, supra note 178, 407.
261. Siemens, supra note 188, It 355-89; ivendi, supra note 191, 1 8.3.2.
262. LG&E Damages Award, supra note 257, 9 35.
263. Id. 1 43 (emphasis added).
264. Id. 9 45 (emphasis added).
265. Id. 1 59.
266. Enron, supra note 178, 384.
267. LG&E Damages Award, supra note 257, '151 ("The question is one of certainty. Tribunals have been
reluctant to provide compensation for claims with inherently speculative elements") (internal quotations
omitted).
268. Vivendi, supra note 191, 1 8.3.3, 8.3.5.
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bunal also affirmed this high standard of proof in determining lost profits, dismissing
PSEG Global's claim for US$301.7 million of lost profits because such compensation
"cannot be justified from a legal or economic point of view in the circumstances of the
case."
269
The Siemens tribunal attempted to stake out a middle ground between these two ap-
proaches. The tribunal rejected a bid by the German firm to collect a further US$124
million for future lost profits, finding that such profits were "very unlikely to have ever
materialized" for a multitude of reasons. 270 Citing language from Factory at Cborzdw that
compensation must take into account "all financially assessable damages," the tribunal did,
however, find Siemens entitled to "not just the value of its enterprise as of... the date of
expropriation, but also to any greater value that enterprise has gained up to the date of this
Award, plus any consequential damages."271 Thus, the tribunal declined to award damages
accruing beyond the award date as too speculative, but awarded damages incurred by Sie-
mens during the arbitration proceedings.
2. Award of Costs
Parties to investor-state arbitrations have traditionally borne their own attorneys' fees
and costs, even though Article 61(2) of the ICSID Convention and Rule 28 of the ICSID
Arbitration Rules grant tribunals discretion to apportion such costs. Recently, however,
tribunals have been increasingly inclined to consider the so-called "loser pays" princi-
ple.272 Although tribunals still tend to favor an equal division of costs in the absence of
"exceptional circumstances," 273 several awards in 2007 reflected an apportionment more
explicitly tied to the merits of the arbitration.
Noting that "there is no uniform practice in treaty arbitration with regard to this mat-
ter," the LG&E tribunal opted for the traditional approach. 274 Although the tribunal had
awarded substantial damages against Argentina, it reasoned that the case called "for an
equitable allocation of costs" because not all of the claims were successful and Argentina
had prevailed on some of its defenses. 275 The tribunal therefore assigned each party its
own attorney's fees and costs. The Siemens tribunal, however, went a step further by
apportioning fees "to take into account that the Claimant has not fully prevailed in these
proceedings." 276 Diverging from the traditional equal division rule, the tribunal split the
269. PSEG Global, supra note 199, TI 315.
270. Siemens, supra note 188, T 379.
271. Id. T 352.
272. The loser pays principle is set out in Article 40 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, although ICSID
arbitrations not subject to the UNCITRAL Rules have also considered this approach. See, e.g., Int'l Thunder-
bird Gaming Corp. v. Mexico, UNCITRAL (NAFTA), Award (Jan. 26, 2006); Metbanex v. United States, Award,
UNCITRAL (NAFTA) (Aug. 3, 2005); Ceskoslovenska Obcbodni Banka v. Slovakia, Award, ICSID Case No.
ARB/97/4 (Dec. 14, 2004).
273. See, e.g., Enron, supra note 178, T 453; Sempra, supra note 187, $ 486; Canfor Corp. v. United States,
Tembec v. United States, and Terminal Forest Products Ltd. v. United States, Consolidated Arbitration pursuant to
article 1126 of NAFTA and the UNCITRAL Rules, at 89 (July 19, 2007).
274. LG&E Damages Award, supra note 257, T 112.
275. Id. 113.
276. Siemens, supra note 188, T 402.
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costs of the arbitration by a 75 percent to 25 percent margin favoring Siemens, although
each party was still ordered to bear its own legal costs.2 77
The Eastern Sugar tribunal also awarded some costs to the claimant in the arbitration.
Adopting a "'broad brush' costs-follow-the-outcome approach," the tribunal declared that
costs should be borne in proportion to the outcome.27 8 Noting that the Czech Republic
had failed with its plea of lack of jurisdiction and other defenses, the tribunal allocated
costs on a 70 percent to 30 percent basis in favor of Eastern Sugar. Similarly, the PSEG
Global tribunal divided costs in the proportion of 65 percent to Turkey and 35 percent to
PSEG Global, as the latter party had prevailed on its jurisdiction and liability claims.2 79
That tribunal, defending the loser-pays approach to cost apportionment, noted that "[t]o
obtain justice, [claimant] had no option but to bring this arbitration forward and to incur
the related costs." 28 0 Notably, this apportionment resulted in Turkey reimbursing PSEG
Global a total of US$4.6 million.
In the sharpest break from the traditional rule of equal apportionment, the Vivendi tri-
bunal considered both the arbitration's outcome on the merits as well as the adequacy and
presentation of the parties' initial arguments. Noting that several of Argentina's jurisdic-
tional objections "were not only without merit" but had already been rejected by "numer-
ous other tribunals before which Argentina has appeared," the tribunal held that
Argentina had "unnecessarily extended and added considerably to the cost of these pro-
ceedings." 28 l The tribunal therefore ordered Argentina to reimburse the claimants for
"the whole of their reasonable costs and counsel fees" covering the jurisdictional phase of
the arbitration. 282
E. ANNuLMENT AND SET ASIDE ACTIONS
Annulment committees have occasionally found fault with the reasoning of tribunals,
but have emphasized the very limited role envisioned for annulment committees under
Article 52 of the ICSID Convention.283 In 2007, five ad hoc annulment committees con-
vened to hear claims for dismissal of ICSID arbitral awards. 284 With one partial excep-
277. Id. Even this small apportionment of fees, however, drew criticism in Professor Janeiro's concurrence.
He contended that it would be more appropriate and in line with arbitral practice for each side to bear half of
the cost of the proceedings. Only "exceptional circumstances," he reasoned, would justify an apportionment
reflecting the decision's award on the merits. "In this case," he concluded "neither Claimant has prevailed in
all of its claims, nor have there been exceptional circumstances." Siemens, supra note 188 (Prof. Janeiro,
separate opinion).
278. Eastern Sugar, supra note 129, 379.
279. PSEG Global, supra note 199, 91352.
280. Id.
281. Vivendi, rupra note 191, TT 10.2.3-10.2.5.
282. Id. 1 10.2.6.
283. Industria Nacional de Alimentos SA. v. Peru, Annulment Proceeding, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/4, 1 97,
116 (Sept. 5, 2007) (finding tribunal's decision "summary and somewhat simplified" but not so excessive as to
warrant annulment; Sir Franklin Berman filed a vigorous dissent); Soufraki v. United Arab Emirates, Annul-
ment Proceeding, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/7 (June 5, 2007) (decision to dismiss annulment claim takes note
of Statement of Dissent).
284. In addition, several challenges to investor-state arbitral awards were also rejected by national courts in
2007. In International Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. Mexico, 473 F. Supp. 2d 80 (D.D.C. 2007), the U.S.
district court held that the NAFTA tribunal had not acted in manifest disregard of law. This decision was
summarily affirmed by the D.C. Circuit. See Int'l Tbunderbird Gaming Corp. v. Mexico, 2007 WL 4165398
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tion, none succeeded. A tribunal's determination that Argentina violated the umbrella
clause of the US-Argentina BIT was annulled in CMS v. Argentina-a decision with no
effect on the damages award.28 5
The CMS annulment decision highlights the ongoing controversy over inconsistent
awards. Though dozens of cases are presently pending against Argentina, only four
awards have been handed down by ICSID tribunals and they have reached contradictory
outcomes about the scope of the necessity defense as applied to Argentina's financial cri-
sis. 286 While the tribunals in CMS, Sempra, and Enron found the necessity defense inap-
plicable, the tribunal in LG&E found the clause properly invoked and Argentina's liability
precluded for part of the crisis. 287 These conflicting decisions have raised concerns about
whether a system without appellate review can resolve, in a consistently principled fash-
ion, such a large number of cases all arising from the same host state actions.
The committee in CMS dismissed Argentina's application for annulment of the tribu-
nal's rejection of the necessity defense. 288 Although the committee felt that the tribunal
applied the law incorrectly, it dismissed the application in light of the very limited scope of
review under Article 52.289 It remains to be seen whether the committee's dicta will shift
the weight of opinion toward the LG&E tribunal's conclusions regarding the Argentine
financial crisis.
F. BOLIVIA WITHDRAWS FROM THE ICSID CONVENTION
On May 2, 2007, Bolivia provided formal notice that it was withdrawing from the IC-
SID Convention effective November 3, 2007. 290 Because no other signatory to the ICSID
Convention has ever withdrawn, the implications of Bolivia's actions are unclear. A state
may "denounce" the Convention by filing a written notice with the ICSID depository, and
the withdrawal takes effect "six months after receipt of such notice." 29 1 It has been argued
that the denunciation of the ICSID Convention has immediate effect and would deny new
(D.C. Cir. Nov. 15, 2007). In Ecuador v. Occidental Erploration & Petroleum Co., [2007] EWCA (Civ) 656,
[2007] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 352, the English Court of Appeal affirmed a decision by the Commercial Court re-
jecting Ecuador's application to set aside an arbitral award for lack of jurisdiction under the U.S.-Ecuador
BIT. In Czech Republic v. European Media Ventures SA, [20071 EWHC (Comm) 2851, the English Commercial
Court similarly dismissed a set aside action challenging an UNCITRAL tribunal's determination that it had
jurisdiction to hear a dispute under the BIT between the Czech Republic and the Belgian-Luxembourg Eco-
nomic Union.
285. CMS Annulment Decision, supra note 240, 9 100, 160.
286. CMS, supra note 243; Sempra, supra note 187; LG&E, supra note 181, 1J 226, 266.
287. CMS, supra note 243; LG&E, supra note 181, T 226, 266 (finding that Argentina is exempt of responsi-
bility and that the claimants should accordingly bear the consequences of the measures taken by the host
state).
288. CMS Annulment Decision, supra note 240, 'I 160.
289. Id. 1 136.
290. News Release, ICSID, Bolivia Submits a Notice Under Article 71 of the ICSID Convention, (May 16, 2007).
According to Pablo Solon, Bolivia's Charge D'affaires for Trade, Bolivia also intends to revise or terminate
many of its BITs. See Damon Vis-Dunbar, Bolivia Notifies World Bank of Withdrawal from ICSID, Pursues BIT
Revisions, INvEsTMETrr TREATY NEWVS, May 9, 2007.
291. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States
art 71, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (noted as ICSID Convention,
supra).
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claimants the right to file a claim against a denouncing state. 292 This position has not
found widespread support.293 Others have pointed out that at least in the six months
following denunciation, claimants are not precluded from proceeding against a denounc-
ing state. 294 Finally, the possibility has been raised that a BIT constitutes independent
consent.295 In any case, the language of the Convention clearly indicates that the denunci-
ation does not affect requests for arbitration submitted prior to denunciation. 296
An arbitral tribunal may soon address what acts constitute consent to jurisdiction-
including whether a BIT's reference to dispute settlement under ICSID qualifies-in a
case brought by Euro Telecom.297 On October 13, 2007, Euro Telecom successfully reg-
istered a case with the ICSID Secretariat to challenge Bolivia's alleged expropriation of its
business investments. Bolivia contends that ICSID lacks jurisdiction to hear the case be-
cause Euro Telecom did not consent to arbitration before withdrawal. 298 Both parties
agree that prior to Bolivia's notice of withdrawal Euro Telecom lodged a complaint in
writing about the nationalization of segments of the telecommunications industry, but
Bolivia insists that the letter made no reference to ICSID and therefore does not consti-
tute consent. Euro Telecom made its formal request for ICSID arbitration well after Bo-
livia's notice of withdrawal.299 Whether an ICSID tribunal has jurisdiction over this case
will be decided by the arbitral panel,300 as the ICSID Secretariat registers all cases unless
they are manifestly outside the Center's jurisdiction. 301
Bolivia's withdrawal from the Convention may represent the first in a series of moves by
other Latin American countries to modify their investment treaty obligations. For exam-
ple, while Ecuador has not denounced the ICSID Convention, it threatened in early May
2007 that it would not renew its BIT with the United States, and on October 29, 2007, it
formally withdrew consent to ICSID jurisdiction over disputes concerning non-renewable
resources pursuant to Article 25(4) of the Convention. 30 2 This latter move may have been
intended to exclude claims stemming from Ecuador's new tax on hydrocarbon investors.
Foreign investors promise to challenge the denial of jurisdiction, claiming that Ecuador's
consent to ICSID arbitration can also be found in relevant BITs and contract terms. 303
292. See CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY (2001) at 1285; Vis-Dunbar,
supra note 290.
293. See Vis-Dunbar, supra note 290; Emmanuel Gaillard, The Denunciation of the ICSID Convention,
N.Y.L.J., June 26, 2007.
294. Gaillard, supra note 293.
295. See id.; Michael Nolan, The Interplay Between State Consent to ICSID Arbitration and Denunciation of the
ICSID Convention: The (Possible) Venezuelan Case Study, Transnat'l Disp. Mgmt. (forthcoming 2008).
296. ICSID Convention, at art. 72.
297. Damon Vis-Dunbar, ICSID Registers Arbitration Claim in Face of Bolivian Objections, INvESTMENT
TREATY NEWS, Nov. 15, 2007.
298. Id.; ICSID Convention, art. 25(1), 72.
299. Vis-Dunbar, supra note 297.
300. ICSID Convention, art. 41(1).
301. ICSID Convention, art. 28(3).
302. See ICSID Convention, art 25(4); Luke Eric Peterson, Ecuador Wants ICSID to Stop Presiding over Min-
ing and Energy Arbitrations, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS, Nov. 30, 2007.
303. Peterson, supra note 302.
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IV. Institutional Developments
Among notable institutional developments occurring in 2007, the Singapore Interna-
tional Arbitration Centre (SIAC) issued a new set of arbitration rules taking effect July 1,
2007. 304 Significantly, the rule changes bring the SIAC rules into closer conformity with
the ICC rules. The new rules require the drawing up of a "Memorandum of Issues" at the
outset of the arbitration, similar to the Terms of Reference procedure used in ICC arbitra-
tion; require scrutiny of awards by the SIAC Registrar, a feature that is also part of ICC
arbitration; and determine fees based on a sliding scale relative to the amount in contro-
versy, which is also the method used in the ICC Rules.
304. See Press Release, New SIAC Rules & Schedule of Fees, Singapore International Arbitration Centre
(May 28, 2007), available at http://www.siac.org.sg/whatsnew-archO7.htm.
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